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A b b r e v i a t i o n s
pm Micrometer
CDC Centers for Disease Control and PreventionCFR Code of Federal RegulationsDO Deportation officer
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DRO Detention and Removal Operations
FOD Field office directorFOH Federal Occupational Health
FPS Federal Protective ServiceHEPA High efficiency particulate air
HHE Health hazard evaluation
IEA Immigration enforcement agent
NAICS N orth American Industry Classification SystemNIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NIRU National Incidence Response Unit
OI Office of InvestigationsOSHA Occupational Safety and Health AdministrationPAPR Powered air-purifying respirator
pH1N1 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1)PPD Purified protein derivativePPE Personal protective equipmentRAC Resident agent in charge
SA Special agent
SAC Special agent in chargeSCBA Self-contained breathing apparatusTST Tuberculin skin test
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Hi g h l i g h t s  o f  t h e  
NIOSH He a l t h  
Ha z a r d  Ev a l u a t i o n
The National Institute 
for Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH) 
received a health 
hazard evaluation 
request from the 
American Federation of 
Government Employees 
in July 2009. The union 
was concerned about 
respiratory protection for 
employees of a federal 
immigration and customs 
agency.
What NIOSH Did
•  We reviewed the agency’s written respiratory protection 
procedures.
•  We observed a respirator fit-testing session at agency 
headquarters.
•  We surveyed employees across all agency workplaces about 
respiratory protection practices.
What NIOSH Found
•  The agency’s written respiratory protection procedures were 
comprehensive. However, written programs were reportedly 
not available at some agency workplaces.
•  The quality of the respirator fit-testing procedures we 
observed was good. However, we did identify some areas that 
could be improved.
•  Most employees who responded to the survey have face- 
to-face contact with immigrants in their current job. This 
contact puts them at risk of getting respiratory infections.
•  Most employees who responded to the survey completed all 
required steps of the respirator fit-testing process. However, 
we did find some gaps between medical clearance and 
respirator training.
•  Few employees reported being screened for tuberculosis in 
the last year.
What Managers Can Do
•  Ensure that the written respiratory protection program is 
available at all agency workplaces.
•  Follow all requirements in the OSHA Respiratory Protection 
standard.
•  Require and arrange fit testing for employees at least 
annually.
•  Develop and maintain clear written procedures for the use of 
respirators.
•  Improve training provided to fit testers. Include more 
information on the technical capabilities of respirators and 
more specific instructions for the fit-testing procedure.
•  Recommend tuberculosis screening for employees at least 
once a year.
•  Recommend the influenza vaccine for employees every year.
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Hi g h l i g h t s  o f  t h e  
NIOSH He a l t h  
Ha z a r d  Ev a l u t i o n
(c o n t in u e d )
What Employees Can Do
•  Follow workplace procedures on use of respirators.
•  Do a face seal check each time before you use a respirator.
•  Get screened for tuberculosis at least once a year.
•  Get the seasonal influenza vaccine every year.
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Su m m a r y
NIOSH investigators 
assessed the respiratory 
protection program at 
federal immigration 
and customs agency 
workplaces nationwide. 
Overall the agency’s 
respiratory protection 
program adequately 
protects employees 
from airborne infectious 
agents. However, several 
areas could be improved.
In July 2009, NIOSH received an HHE request from the American 
Federation of Government Employees. The union was concerned 
about respiratory protection for federal immigration and customs 
agency employees during the pH1N1 pandemic. NIOSH 
investigators reviewed the agency’s written respiratory protection 
procedures, observed a respirator fit-testing session for employees 
at agency headquarters, and surveyed employees nationwide about 
respiratory protection practices.
We found that the agency’s respiratory protection policy, the 
respirator medical evaluation questionnaire, the qualitative fit- 
testing protocol, and the slide presentation serving as training 
for fit testers were comprehensive. The quality of the observed 
respirator fit-testing procedures was good. However, we identified 
several areas that needed improvement.
Though the response rate for our survey was suboptimal with 
2,218 responding employees, we found that that most respondents, 
particularly those from DRO and OI, have face-to-face contact with 
immigrants in their current job. This contact places them at risk 
for exposure to airborne infectious agents, including Mycobacterium  
tuberculosis, influenza virus, rubeola virus, and varicella zoster virus. 
Most respondents completed all of the steps required for respirator 
use (medical clearance, respirator training, respirator fit testing). 
However, some gaps between medical clearance and respirator 
training existed. We also found low employee compliance with 
respirator usage and annual tuberculosis screening. The written 
respiratory protection programs were not readily available in some 
workplaces.
The agency should maintain a written respiratory protection 
program for all workplaces to protect against airborne infectious 
agents and other respiratory hazards. The agency should require 
and arrange fit testing for employees at least annually and verify 
medical clearance prior to the fit test. Clear written procedures 
for the use of respirators should be developed and maintained, 
and specific indications for respirator usage should be included 
in training. Annual evaluations of the workplaces to ensure that 
the written respiratory protection program is being properly 
implemented should be conducted. Training provided to 
employees and fit testers should be improved to include more 
information on the technical capabilities of respirators and more specific instructions for performing face seal checks and for 
donning and doffing respirators. Employees who should undergo
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(CONTINUED) routine tuberculosis screening should be identified and informed.Finally, annual influenza vaccination should be recommended to 
all employees.
Su m m a r y
Keywords: NAICS 928120 (International Affairs), tuberculosis, TB, 
immigration facility, influenza, H1N1, measles, rubeola, chicken pox, 
varicella, infections, respirators, respiratory protection
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In t r o d u c t i o n O n July 7, 2009, NIOSH received an HHE request from the American Federation of Government Employees. The request 
concerned the potential transmission of airborne infectious agents 
at federal immigration and customs agency workplaces nationwide. 
The union was concerned about respiratory protection provided to 
its employees during the pH 1N1 pandemic. Though the initial focus 
of the request by the union was on DRO, employer representatives 
asked that we expand our evaluation to include all other divisions of 
the agency.
We discussed the request with union and employer representatives. 
We learned that the DHS issued interim guidance concerning 
PPE use by its employees in 2009 during the pH 1N1 pandemic. 
Specifically, it provided guidance concerning voluntary use of an N95 respirator for employees in contact with persons known or 
suspected to have pH1N1 infection. It stated that managers and 
supervisors must provide their employees with a copy of Appendix D 
of the OSHA Respiratory Protection standard [29 CFR 1910.134].
W hile fit testing is not required for voluntary use of the N95 
respirator, the agency launched a campaign, through NIRU, to 
qualitatively fit test more than 13,000 employees in July 2009 in 
anticipation of potential exposures to pH1N 1 virus during the 
pandemic. This fit-testing campaign was completed in September 
2009. All mission-essential personnel, defined by the agency, were 
required to be fit tested. Employees were required to complete 
an online respirator medical evaluation questionnaire through FOH. The total number of employees who underwent fit testing 
nationwide during this campaign was 13,777. The total number of 
employees successfully fitted for a respirator was not known at the 
national level.
Immigration and Customs Agency
The agency, part of DHS, is charged with protecting national security 
by enforcing the nation’s immigration and customs laws. This agency 
employs approximately 19,000 persons in more than 400 offices 
nationwide and around the world. It is comprised of four main 
operational divisions: Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Office of Investigations, Office of Intelligence, and Office of 
International Affairs. Effective October 28, 2009, FPS, formerly an 
operational division of the agency, was placed under the National Protection and Programs Directorate of DHS.
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In t r o d u c t i o n
(c o n t i n u e d ) DRO is the primary enforcement arm within the agency for the identification, apprehension, and removal of illegal, fugitive, and 
criminal immigrants from the United States. Approximately 7,600 
employees work in DRO out of detention facilities, field offices 
and subfield offices, holding areas, and staging locations. OI is responsible for investigating, deterring, and interdicting threats 
arising from the movement of people and goods into and out of 
the United States. OI employs approximately 7,900 individuals. 
The Office of Intelligence collects, analyzes, and shares strategic 
and tactical data for use by the agency and the DHS management 
and operational units. The Office of Intelligence employs 
approximately 300 individuals. The Office of International Affairs 
employs approximately 300 individuals in more than 60 locations 
around the world. These international attaché offices coordinate 
investigations and law enforcement duties with international 
partners. The Office of State/Local Coordination, the National 
Firearms and Tactical Training Unit, the Office of Training and 
Development, and NIRU are also considered operational offices 
within the agency. NIRU develops, implements, and oversees 
key preparedness, prevention, response and recovery programs, 
and projects. It also supports and establishes uniformity of 
agency incident management and response efforts. The agency’s 
management divisions employ more than 800 individuals, while 
the leadership offices within the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
employ more than 2,100 individuals.
Occupational medical clinical services, including immunizations, 
tuberculosis screening, and medical clearance for respirator use are 
provided to employees in partnership with the U.S. Public Health 
Service/FOH. Employees may be exposed to a variety of respiratory 
hazards while conducting law enforcement activities, emergency 
responses, or special operations.
Airborne Infectious Agents
Airborne transmission of infectious agents occurs by dissemination 
of either airborne droplet nuclei or small particles in the respirable 
size range (< 10 pm) containing agents that remain infective over 
time and distance. These particles may remain suspended in air 
for long periods and may be widely dispersed by air currents. The 
microorganisms in these particles may be inhaled by susceptible 
individuals who have or have not had face-to-face contact with the 
infectious individual. Infectious agents that are transmitted by the
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In t r o d u c t i o n
( c o n t i n u e d ) airborne route include Mycobacterium tuberculosis [Riley et al. 1959; Haley et al. 1989; Beck-Sague et al. 1992], rubeola virus (measles) [Bloch et al. 1985], and varicella zoster virus (chickenpox) [Leclair 
et al. 1980]. Although influenza viruses are thought to be mainly 
spread by droplet transmission (i.e., large respiratory droplets 
generated by coughing or sneezing and propelled over short 
distances), evidence for airborne transmission also exists [Bridges 
et al. 2003; Blachere et al. 2009; Lindsley et al. 2010a,b]. Detailed 
information on these airborne infectious agents can be found in Appendix A of this report.
A comprehensive program to prevent the spread of pathogens 
transmitted via the airborne route consists of engineering, 
administrative, and personal respiratory protection controls. 
Engineering controls such as the use of special air handling and 
ventilation systems are often used to help remove infectious 
agents in potentially high exposure areas such as isolation rooms or cells. Administrative controls include training employees on 
infectious control practices and medical surveillance programs for 
tuberculosis. In addition, respiratory protection is recommended 
for healthcare personnel and correctional and detention facility 
staff for protection against airborne infectious agents such as 
tuberculosis [CDC 2005, 2006]. More information on these 
controls can be found in Appendix A of this report.
Background on Respirators and Regulations
An estimated 5 million workers in 1.3 million U.S. workplaces 
are required to wear respirators at least some of the time while performing their job functions [OSHA 2010]. A respirator is a 
personal protective device that is worn on the face, covers at least 
the nose and mouth, and is designed to protect the wearer from 
inhaling hazardous airborne particles (including dust particles and 
infectious agents), gases, or vapors. Respirators should only be used 
as a “last line of defense” when engineering and administrative 
controls are not feasible or before these controls are implemented. 
Detailed information on respirators can be found in Appendix B 
of this report.
The current OSHA standard 29 CFR 1910.134, or Respiratory 
Protection standard, was implemented in April 1998 [29 CFR
1910.134]. It requires employers to provide respirators when they
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In t r o d u c t i o n
( c o n t i n u e d )
A s s e s s m e n t
are necessary to protect the health of the employee. It also requires 
that employers develop and implement a written respiratory 
protection program when respirators are required. The standard 
contains requirements for program administration, worksite- 
specific procedures, respirator selection, employee training, fit 
testing, medical evaluation, respirator use, respirator cleaning, 
maintenance and repair, and other revisions. Employers must 
provide respirators, training, and medical evaluations at no cost to 
employees [29 CFR 1910.134]. The OSHA Respiratory Protection 
standard can be found at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/ 
owadisp.show document?p id=12716&p table=standards.
O ur evaluation had three components: a review of the agency’s 
written respiratory protection procedures, observation of a respirator fit-testing session at agency headquarters, and 
administration of an electronic survey about respiratory protection 
practices across all agency workplaces.
Review of Written Respiratory Protection Procedures
We reviewed the agency’s respiratory protection policy, Directive 
Number 70005.1 dated January 31, 2007. FOH granted us access to 
the online respirator medical evaluation questionnaire for agency 
employees. We evaluated its components and compared it to the information mandated in Appendix C of the OSHA Respiratory 
Protection standard [29 CFR 1910.134]. We also reviewed the 
agency’s qualitative fit testing protocol, including the fit-test 
checklist and instructions for fit testers. In addition, we reviewed 
the slide presentation that served as training given by FPS for fit 
testers.
Observation of a Respirator Fit-testing Session
A NIOSH investigator observed a qualitative respirator fit testing 
session at agency headquarters in August 2009. He observed a 
num ber of fit testers at various stations throughout the day and 
observed individual fit testers over successive fit tests. He listened 
to fit-tester instructions to employees being fit tested, noted specific
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( c o n t i n u e d ) procedures used for qualitatively fit testing the respirators, and gauged the level of understanding of the fit-testing procedure 
shown by both the fit tester and the employee being fit tested.
Electronic Survey
We surveyed employees about the implementation of respiratory protection and other infection control measures for airborne 
infectious agents at workplaces nationwide. O ur objectives were 
to assess the completeness of employee coverage of the recently 
completed fit-testing campaign, identify barriers to undergoing 
and completing respirator fit testing, determine the success rates 
of respirator fit testing and reasons for unsuccessful tests, and 
assess adherence to other infection control measures for airborne 
infectious agents. We also looked at the role of the designated 
health and safety officer in the respiratory protection program and 
the respirator fit testers’ attitudes towards the fit-testing process.
In January and February 2010, we disseminated an electronic 
survey to 19,424 current employees. The electronic questionnaire 
was sent to employees by agency managers through two broadcast 
e-mails. The survey was also placed on the agency intranet website. 
All employees were invited to participate. The questionnaire was anonymous and included no personal identifying information. 
Respondents had the option of returning the completed 
questionnaire directly to NIOSH investigators electronically or by 
fax. Surveys were collected over 6 weeks. The agency management and union sent multiple e-mail reminders to employees during 
the survey period. The survey included questions about work 
history, the recent respirator fit-testing campaign, tuberculosis 
screening, influenza vaccination, and workplace exposures to 
airborne infectious agents. Questions also addressed beliefs about 
and attitudes towards workplace practices and risk of acquiring 
infection, health and safety officers’ knowledge about the 
respiratory protection program, and attitudes of fit testers towards 
the fit-testing process.
We summarized survey results using medians, ranges, and 
proportions as appropriate. Responses to questions about 
attitudes and beliefs were categorized as “expressed agreement” if 
respondents marked “agree” or “tend to agree,” and as “expressed 
disagreement” if respondents marked “disagree” or “tend to 
disagree.” Responses of “neither agree nor disagree” were left as is.
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Re s u l t s Review of the Written Respiratory Protection Procedures
The agency’s respiratory protection policy, Directive Number 
70005.1 dated January 31, 2007, provides guidelines for 
establishing and implementing a respiratory protection program. 
The policy states that the Health, Safety, and Environment Section within the Facilities Branch of the Office of Asset Management 
shall establish, implement, and maintain a respiratory protection 
program for employees. The program contains all of the basic 
elements required by OSHA including respirator selection, medical 
evaluation, respirator training, fit testing, respirator use, respirator 
cleaning, and maintenance and repair [29 CFR 1910.134]. It also clarifies the responsibilities within the program. W hile the 
Health, Safety, and Environment Section is responsible for overall coordination and implementation, NIRU is responsible for 
ensuring compliance with new or updated policies and guidance, 
specifically in the area of pandemic influenza. FPS is responsible for supporting the agency’s programs in fit testing and training. 
However, it is uncertain if FPS maintains this responsibility 
because of organizational changes. Each program is responsible 
for ensuring that appropriate employees are identified, trained, 
and provided with PPE, and for developing standard operating 
procedures and /o r guidance.
The agency’s fit-testing procedures included all the elements required by the OSHA Respiratory Protection standard [29 CFR
1910.134] (Appendix B). The program requires medical clearance 
prior to fit testing. The online respirator medical evaluation 
questionnaire contains all questions found in the OSHA 
Respirator Medical Evaluation Questionnaire, Appendix C, to the 
OSHA Respiratory Protection standard [29 CFR 1910.134]. It also 
contains specific follow-up questions for “yes” answers to specific 
symptoms or problems. U pon completing the questionnaire, 
employees are immediately informed whether or not they have 
been medically cleared to wear a respirator. Employees are able to 
print a copy of the letter, and the system provides the clearance 
to the employee’s Program Office and the Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Officer at headquarters. Employees who are not 
medically cleared by the questionnaire are sent for a follow-up 
medical evaluation.
The agency’s fit-testing procedures incorporated respirator 
training during the fit-testing procedure; no separate training 
session existed for employees. The agency employed qualitative
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( c o n t i n u e d )
Figure 1. The 3M 8210 N95 respirator 
for which employees were fit tested. 
Photo © 2011 3M Company. All rights 
reserved.
Figure 2. The 3M 8511 N95 respirator 
for which employees were fit tested. 
Photo © 2011 3M Company. All rights 
reserved.
Figure 3. The 3M 8110S N95 respirator 
for which employees were fit tested. 
Photo © 2011 3M Company. All rights 
reserved.
fit testing consisting of a sensitivity test and a fit test. Fit testers 
were instructed about giving directions on proper donning and 
seal checking. The qualitative fit testing protocol contained the 
procedures for the sensitivity test and the fit test. Saccharin or 
Bitrex® was used as the challenge agent. Employees were required to perform eight simple tasks while wearing the respirator. The fit 
testing overview document stated that “if an individual detects the 
test solution at any time during the eight tasks, the N95 respirator 
will be refitted and retested. If the individual detects the taste a 
second time, he or she may be tested on another model of the 
N95 respirator. If an appropriate facial seal is not achieved with 
the second model, the individual cannot wear an N95 respirator 
and should be assigned to duties that would not expose him or 
her to airborne hazardous conditions.” Fit testers were also given a 
checklist of instructions and actions for the fit-testing process. This 
checklist is comprehensive and contains the necessary details for 
each step of the process.
The slide presentation for training fit testers was thorough in the 
topics covered. It addressed the selection of respirators, general 
information on particulate filtering facepiece respirators, medical 
evaluation, and the details of administering a qualitative fit test. 
The training presentation also included the necessary equipment 
and materials, pretest preparations, and instructions for individuals 
being tested.
Observation of Respirator Fit-testing Session
On August 7, 2009, a NIOSH investigator observed the third of 3 
days of qualitative respirator fit testing. Employees were fit tested 
for N95 filtering facepiece respirators in anticipation of potential exposures to pH1N1 virus during the pandemic.
Eleven fit-testing stations were set up, with each station’s table 
approximately 8 feet from the next table. As employees arrived for 
testing after having been medically cleared to wear a respirator, they 
were checked in and directed to one of the fit-testing stations. Though 
the agency’s fit testing overview document stated that employees 
would have two respirator model options during fit testing, three N95 
respirators were available to employees on the observed testing date: 
3M™8210, 3M8511, and 3M 8110S (Figures 1-3). The 3M 8210 and 
8110S models are similar respirators and only vary in size.
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( c o n t i n u e d ) The fit testers followed the qualitative fit-testing checklist developed by the agency for the saccharin sensitivity test and the respirator fit 
test. A 3M™ FT-10 fit-test apparatus was used for the qualitative fit 
tests. Bitrex® solution was available for employees who were not sensitive to saccharin. Depending on the agency program, the fit 
tester chose either the 3M 8210 model or the 3M 8511 model for 
fit testing. For example, OI employees were offered the 3M 8210 
model; DRO employees were offered the 3M 8511. The reasoning 
behind this selection was practical; DRO agents were more likely to encounter pH1N1 exposures and to wear their respirators longer. 
The 3M 8511 model respirator has an exhalation valve that may make it more comfortable.
If the fit test failed, the employee was asked to wait 15 minutes, 
and the fit test was repeated using the same model respirator. If 
the fit test failed a second time, the smaller 3M 8110S model was 
tried. If the employee was successfully fit tested in one of the three 
respirator models, he or she was provided three respirators of that 
model to personally keep and store until needed.
Instructions Provided By the Fit Tester
The pertinent and required instructions provided by the fit testers 
were typically comprehensive and closely followed the agency’s 
qualitative fit-testing checklist. Similar information was relayed 
to employees as they were being fit tested, irrespective of the particular fit tester. However, the NIOSH investigator noted a few 
deficiencies.
First, in a few instances, he observed that the top strap of the 
respirator was placed below the crown of the fit-test subject’s 
head. The manufacturer’s instructions state that the top strap is 
to be placed high on the top back of the subject’s head, effectively 
crossing the crown of the individual’s head [3M 2001]. While 
seemingly minor, incorrect placement of straps may result in a poor 
fit test.
Second, every fit tester observed required that the fit-test subject 
check for leakage around the face seal. However, the instructions on how to perform the face seal check did not often conform to 
instructions provided by the respirator manufacturer. For example, 
fit-test subjects were told to place the thum b and forefingers of 
both hands in C-shaped positions around the seal of the respirator
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( c o n t i n u e d ) and then inhale to identify any leaks. The fit testers did comment if they observed dimpling of the respirator, indicating a negative 
pressure was being achieved inside the respirator. However, these 
directions differ from the manufacturer instructions that state “To 
check the respirator-to-face seal, place both hands completely over 
the respirator and inhale sharply. Be careful not to disturb the 
position of the respirator. A negative pressure should be felt inside 
the respirator” [3M 2001].
Finally, in Part 1, Section A.6. of Appendix A of the OSHA 
Respiratory Protection standard, the OSHA-accepted Fit Test 
Protocol requirements, state “If the test subject is not familiar with 
using a particular respirator, the test subject shall be directed to 
don the mask several times and to adjust the straps each time to 
become adept at setting proper tension on the straps” [29 CFR
1910.134]. The NIOSH investigator observed that subjects were 
instructed to don the respirator a single time.
Qualitative Fit-testing Procedures
The fit-testing procedures generally followed Appendix A of 
the OSHA Respiratory Protection standard [29 CFR 1910.134]. 
However, in some instances, agency protocols differed from the 
OSHA-mandated procedures. First, the NIOSH investigator 
observed that some male agency employees with facial hair crossing 
the respirator sealing surface were fit tested and provided with 
the N95 respirators. Part 1, Section A.9 of the OSHA Respiratory 
Protection standard Appendix A, specifically states that “The test 
shall not be conducted if there is any hair growth between the skin 
and the facepiece sealing surface, such as stubble beard growth, 
beard, mustache, or sideburns which cross the respirator sealing 
surface” [29 CFR 1910.134].
Second, he observed that a selection of respirators was not 
available for each employee being tested. Due to logistical concerns, 
the model of respirator that the employee was fit tested on was 
preselected by the fit tester according to the division in which the 
employee worked. Part 1, Section A.1 of the OSHA Respiratory 
Protection standard states that “The test subject shall be allowed 
to pick the most acceptable respirator from a sufficient num ber of 
respirator models and sizes so that the respirator is acceptable to 
the user” [29 CFR 1910.134].
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( c o n t i n u e d ) Finally, no mirror was available during the fit-testing procedures for the subjects to evaluate the positioning of the respirator on their face. Part 1, Section A.1 of Appendix A of the OSHA Respiratory 
Protection standard, states that “A mirror shall be available to assist 
the subject in evaluating the fit and positioning of the respirator”
[29 CFR 1910.134].
Level of Understanding of the Fit-testing Procedure Shown by the Fit Tester
The NIOSH investigator learned that some fit testers did not have 
a solid understanding of the aerosols against which respirators are 
meant to protect the wearer. For example, many fit testers explained 
that an N95 respirator will filter 95% of particles down to 3 pm, 
which would include 100% of viruses, but may not be effective 
against smaller biological agents. In fact, N95 respirators are tested 
against and are at least 95% efficient in filtering particles with a 0.3 
pm diameter, the size of particles that most easily passes through 
particulate filters. Although viruses and other particles may indeed 
be smaller, contrary to expectations, they do not penetrate the 
respirator filters as readily as particles with a 0.3 pm diameter, mainly 
because of capture mechanisms such as diffusion or electrostatic 
attraction. Therefore, the N95 respirator will effectively filter 
particles with diameters larger and smaller than 0.3 pm.
Cross-sectional Survey
We received 2,251 completed surveys by e-mail and by fax. O f this 
total, 33 respondents were excluded from our analysis because they reported working for FPS, which was no longer a program within 
the agency. Thus, we received 2,218 valid surveys out of 19,424 
employees who were reported by management to have received the 
broadcast e-mail, a response rate of 11%. O f the 2,218 respondents, 
1,648 (74%) were male, and 564 (26%) were female. The median 
age was 40 years, with a range of 21-74 years.
Work Characteristics
Employees from OI (49%) and DRO (45%) made up the majority of respondents. The largest num ber of respondents primarily 
worked in SAC or RAC offices (40%) and DRO field offices 
or suboffices (31%). Respondents working in all 50 states, the
Page 10 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2009-0184-3126
Results
( c o n t i n u e d ) District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam were represented.In addition, three employees working in Hong Kong, Italy, and 
Mexico responded. The most commonly reported job titles 
were SA or other investigations employee (37%), IEA (17%), 
administrative employee (17%), and DO (10%). The median 
num ber of hours worked a week was 50 (range: 16 to 110 hours). 
O ther work characteristics of respondents are shown in Table
1. Seventy-six (3%) respondents reported being the local union 
representative at their workplace.
O f the 2,208 respondents who answered the question, 1,654 (75%) 
respondents reported having face-to-face contact with immigrants 
in their current job. Most employees in DRO (82%) and OI (74%) 
reported face-to-face contact with immigrants. Face-to-face contact was 
high among IEAs (99%), DOs (93%), DRO supervisors (87%), and 
SAs and other OI employees (83%), all job titles within DRO and OI. 
Respondents (n = 1,569) reported the median hours worked per week 
with face-to-face contact with immigrants was 6 hours (range: 0.15 to 60 
hours).
Respirator Fit Testing Process Results
Respiratory protection characteristics of all respondents, DRO 
respondents, and OI respondents are shown in Table 2. Most (85%) 
respondents reported having undergone medical clearance to wear 
a respirator in the previous year. Of the 1,839 respondents who 
underwent medical clearance, most (98%) reported they were medically 
cleared.
Most (84%) respondents reported having had training on the proper 
use of respirators, and most (88%) reported having undergone 
respirator fit testing at their current workplace during the previous year. The most common reasons cited for not having respirator fit 
testing in the previous year were “I was not informed that fit testing was 
occurring,” “I am a new hire,” and “I don’t know.” O f the respondents 
who reported having face-to-face contact with immigrants, 88% 
reported undergoing medical clearance, 87% reported undergoing 
respirator training, and 92% reported undergoing respirator fit testing.
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( c o n t i n u e d )
Table 1. Work characteristics of survey respondents
Work Characteristic No. Respondents (%) n = 2,031-2,213*
Agency program
OI 1,078 (49)
DRO 996 (45)
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor 59 (3)
Office of Intelligence 40 (2)
Other 40 (2)
Type of primary workplace
SAC, deputy SAC, assistant SAC, RAC office 892 (40)
DRO field office or suboffice 687 (31)
Other federal government building 259 (12)
Service processing center 111 (5)
Contract detention facility 90 (4)
Staging facility 23 (1)
Other 143 (6)
Location of primary workplace
South region! 615 (30)
West region}: 573 (28)
Northeast region§ 505 (25)
Midwest region^ 338 (17)
Job title
SA, other investigations employee 810 (37)
IEA 383 (17)
Administrative employee 368 (17)
DO 210 (10)
DRO supervisor 179 (8)
Investigations supervisor 138 (6)
Attorney 59 (3)
Intelligence officer, specialist, supervisor, director 29 (1)
Other 35 (2)
*Samples sizes ranged 2,031-2,213 due to missing values.
|South region includes District of Columbia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Puerto Rico. 
tWest region includes Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, 
Arizona, Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam.
§Northeast region includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware.
^Midwest region includes Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Minnesota, 
Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Kansas.
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( c o n t i n u e d ) Most (97%) of the 1,943 respondents who underwent fit testing and reported whether or not they were successfully fitted for a respirator 
reported they were successfully fitted. The most common reasons cited 
for not being successfully fitted were “I could not get a tight seal of the 
respirator on my face,” “the correct size respirator for my face was not 
available,” “I have facial hair,” and “I could not smell/taste the test 
aerosol used for fit testing.”
Most (75%) of the 2,161 respondents who answered all questions 
related to the respirator fit-testing process reported completing all 
steps of the process (i.e., medical clearance, respirator training, and 
fit testing) and were successfully fitted for a respirator. O f the 2,161 
respondents, 30 (1%) completed all steps but were not successfully 
fitted for a respirator. A total of 189 (9%) respondents reported completing none of the three steps of the respirator fit testing 
process while 313 (14%) respondents reported not completing one 
or two steps of the process.
Respirator Access and Usage
A total of 1,968 (89%) respondents reported having access to an 
N95 filtering facepiece respirator at their current workplace, with 
96% of DRO respondents and 89% of OI respondents reporting 
access. O f those who reported having face-to-face contact with 
immigrants, 92% reported having access to an N95 respirator.
Regarding respirator usage, 235 (11%) respondents reported ever wearing an N95 filtering facepiece respirator, and 25 (1%) 
respondents reported wearing another type of respirator (type 
unspecified) at their current workplace in the previous year. O f 
those respondents who reported wearing an N95 filtering facepiece 
respirator, 79 (34%) reported wearing it for contact with someone 
with tuberculosis, while 144 (61%) reported wearing it for contact 
with someone with pH1N1or other influenza-like illness. Other 
reasons not listed in the survey but written in by respondents 
included for precautionary use (n = 8) and contact with narcotics 
(n = 7). O f those respondents who reported wearing another type 
of respirator, 5 (20%) reported wearing it for contact with someone 
with tuberculosis, while 2 (8%) reported wearing it for contact with 
someone with pH1N1 or other influenza-like illness. O ther reasons 
not listed in the survey but written in by respondents included for 
training (n = 5) and hazardous material exposure (n = 6).
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( c o n t i n u e d )
Table 2. Respiratory protection characteristics of survey respondents
Practice
Number Total 
Respondents (%)
Number DRO 
Respondents (%)
Number OI 
Respondents (%)
Underwent medical clearance to 
wear respirator
1,878 of 2,211 (85) 883 of 994 (89) 948 of 1,075 (88)
Cleared to wear respirator* 1,802 of 1,839 (98) 855 of 867 (99) 905 of 926 (98)
Had respirator training 1,852 of 2,209 (84) 898 of 993 (90) 912 of 1,074 (85)
Underwent respirator fit testing 1,955 of 2,216 (88) 949 of 996 (95) 964 of 1,077 (90)
Successfully fitted! 1,885 of 1,943 (97) 925 of 945 (98) 925 0f 957 (97)
*The denominators include those respondents who underwent medical clearance.
|The denominators include those respondents who underwent respirator fit testing.
W hen broken down by agency program, 176 (18%) of 994 DRO 
respondents reported ever wearing an N95 filtering facepiece 
respirator, and 14 (1%) of 991 DRO respondents reported wearing 
another type of respirator at their current workplace in the 
previous year. Fifty-five (5%) of 1,078 OI respondents reported 
wearing an N95 filtering facepiece respirator, and 11 (1%) of 1,076 
OI respondents reported ever wearing another type of respirator 
at their current workplace in the previous year. Job titles with the 
highest percentages of respondents reporting ever wearing an N95 
respirator in the previous year were IEA (26%), DO (16%), and DRO supervisor (16%).
O f the 235 respondents who reported ever wearing an N95 
filtering facepiece respirator at their current workplace in the 
previous year, 214 (91%) had undergone respirator training during 
the previous year. In addition, 225 (96%) reported undergoing 
respirator fit testing in the previous year. O f the 223 respondents 
who reported ever wearing an N95 respirator and undergoing a 
respirator fit test in the previous year and reported whether or not 
it was successful, 218 (98%) reported having a successful fit test.
Most (69%) respondents expressed agreement that their workplace 
does its best to have respirators available when they are needed, 
and most (62%) respondents expressed agreement that the 
appropriate respirator is always available for them when they need 
it. A smaller percentage of respondents (46%) expressed agreement 
that their workplace has clear written procedures for the use of 
respirators.
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( c o n t i n u e d ) Infectious Diseases Exposures and Infection Control Practices
Most (59%) respondents expressed agreement that their workplace 
does its best to protect workers from exposure to respiratory infections. Although most (62%) respondents expressed agreement 
that they were at risk of catching influenza, tuberculosis, or other 
respiratory infection due to their job, fewer (33%) respondents 
expressed agreement that they frequently worry about catching 
influenza, tuberculosis, or other respiratory infection due to their 
job.
The numbers of respondents who reported having face-to-face 
contact with persons with known infections in the previous year 
were 403 (18%) for tuberculosis, 28 (1%) for measles, and 96 (4%) for chicken pox. The num ber of respondents who reported having 
face-to-face contact with persons with known pH1N1 between 
April 2009 and survey administration was 376 (17%). O f the 403 
respondents who reported having face-to-face contact with persons 
with known tuberculosis, 68 (17%) of them reported wearing an 
N95 respirator during contact.
Regarding tuberculosis screening practices, 466 (21%) respondents 
reported having had a tuberculosis skin test or PPD test in the previous year. The most common places where respondents 
received their last tuberculosis skin test were an FOH clinic (50%) 
and a personal physician’s office (27%). Twenty (4%) respondents 
reported receiving their last tuberculosis skin test at their 
workplace. The most common reasons cited by respondents who 
did not have a tuberculosis skin test in the previous year for not 
having one were, “I did not think I needed a tuberculosis skin test” 
(48%), “I have not been told that I need to get tested” (46%), “I 
have not felt sick” (21%), and “I do not know where to get tested” 
(12%). (Respondents could cite more than one reason.) Six percent 
of respondents reported previously testing positive or having a 
history of latent or active tuberculosis.
A total of 273 (28%) DRO respondents and 178 (16%) OI 
respondents reported having had a tuberculosis skin test in the 
previous year. O f the total respondents who reported having 
face-to-face contact with immigrants, 378 (23%) reported having 
had a tuberculosis skin test in the previous year. Job titles with 
the highest percentage of respondents reporting having had a 
tuberculosis skin test in the previous year were IEA (38%), DRO
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( c o n t i n u e d ) supervisor (26%), administrative personnel (18%), special agent or other OI employee (18%), and DO (17%). O f the 35 respondents 
from the “other” category for job title, 34% reported having had a 
tuberculosis skin test in the previous year.
A total of 997 (45%) respondents reported having received the 
seasonal influenza vaccine between October 1, 2008, and March 
31, 2009. The most common places where respondents received 
this seasonal influenza vaccine were at an FOH clinic (37%), at 
their personal physician’s office (34%), and at a pharmacy or 
store (8%). Fifty-four (5%) respondents reported receiving their 
seasonal influenza vaccine at their workplace. The most common 
reasons cited by the 1,215 respondents who did not have a seasonal 
influenza vaccine during the above period were “I didn’t think 
I needed the flu vaccine” (42%), “I did not think the influenza 
vaccine would keep me from getting the flu” (23%), “other” reason 
(15%), “It was inconvenient for me to get vaccinated” (11%), “The 
influenza vaccine causes the flu or makes me sick” (10%), and “the 
influenza vaccine is not safe (8%). (Respondents could cite more 
than one reason.) “O ther” reasons included “I did not want it” and
» T  . • .I never get it.
Designated Safety Officer
O f the 111 designated safety officers throughout the agency, 70 
completed the survey for a response rate of 63%. They represented 
3% of the total survey respondents. O f these 70 safety officers,
33 (47%) were from OI, 32 (46%) were from DRO, 4 (6%) were 
from the Office of Intelligence, and 1 (1%) was from the Office of 
the Principal Legal Advisor. O f the 69 respondents who answered 
the subsequent questions, 30 (43%) reported having a written 
respiratory protection program at their workplace, 17 (25%) 
reported not having one, and 22 (32%) reported not knowing. 
Sixteen (50%) DRO safety officers and 18 (56%) OI safety officers 
reported either not having a written respiratory protection program or not knowing they had one. Excluding those respondents who 
worked in “other” workplaces not listed in the survey, the two most 
common workplaces of the safety officers that reported either not 
having a written respiratory protection program or not knowing 
whether they had one were SAC or RAC office (n = 13) and DRO 
field office or suboffice (n = 12). These two workplaces are the most common workplaces in the agency.
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( c o n t i n u e d ) Most of the 30 responding safety officers who reported having a written respiratory protection program reported that their written 
program addressed all of the areas listed in the OSHA Respiratory 
Protection standard [29 CFR 1910.134]. Between 90% and 97% of 
responding safety officers reported that their workplace’s written 
respiratory protection program addressed most of the individual 
areas listed in the standard. However, fewer reported that their 
workplace’s program addressed medical evaluations of employees for respirator use (83%); cleaning, disinfecting, storing, inspecting, 
repairing, and discarding respirators (73%); and evaluating the 
effectiveness of the program (70%).
O f the 69 designated safety officers, 23 (33%) reported they 
were the respiratory protection program administrator at their 
workplace. Nine of these 23 safety officers reported overseeing 
these programs without having received specific respirator training. O f the 13 who did receive training, the most common sources 
of training reported were on-the-job training (n = 6), a multi-day respirator use training course (n = 5), and a one-day respirator use 
training course (n = 3).
Seven (10%) of the 69 designated safety officers reported they 
were involved in the selection of respirators for employees at their 
workplace. O f 69 safety officers, 68 reported that some type of 
mask or respiratory protection was available at their workplace. 
These safety officers reported availability of surgical masks (29%), 
dust masks (26%), N95 filtering respirators (96%), and full 
facepiece elastomeric air purifying respirators (3%). Half-mask 
elastomeric air purifying respirators and PAPRs were not reported 
to be available at their workplace. O ne safety officer answered 
“I don’t know” to the question about what type of respiratory 
protection was available at his or her workplace.
Fit Testers
A total of 245 (11%) of 2,160 respondents reported having been 
trained to become a respirator fit tester, 150 in the previous year and 
95 more than 1 year earlier. The agency reported that 319 employees 
were trained as fit testers during the fit-testing campaign of 2009, giving a response rate of 47% among fit testers. The median number 
of employees fit tested by the 119 responding fit testers from May 
2009 to survey administration was 20 employees (range: 0-400 
employees).
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Re s u l t s( „ „ .  |T|. .. .pp.) Twenty-three fit testers who trained in the previous year and 91
fit testers who trained more than 1 year earlier did not answer the 
subsequent question of who trained them. O f the 131 fit testers 
who did answer subsequent questions, most (74%) reported being 
trained by another agency employee, while 24 (18%) reported being 
trained by FPS HazMat Technicians fit testers.
In addition, between 94 and106 fit testers did not answer subsequent questions regarding their comfort level with their 
expertise. O f those who did answer these questions, 109 (72%) 
expressed agreement that they feel comfortable conducting a 
qualitative respirator fit test on an employee, 105 (72%) expressed 
agreement that they feel comfortable giving instructions to fit-test 
subjects during the fit-testing session, and 79 (54%) expressed 
agreement that they feel comfortable answering technical 
questions about respirator effectiveness. Ninety-seven (70%) fit 
testers expressed agreement that the fit tests that they conduct 
are accurate, while 87 (62%) fit testers expressed agreement that 
the training session they attended adequately prepared them to 
conduct fit tests.
D i s c u s s i o n W hile the response rate to our survey was suboptimal, our results yield useful information regarding employee exposures to airborne 
infectious agents and respiratory protection at the agency. Most 
(75%) employees who responded to the survey, particularly 
those from DRO and OI, reported having face-to-face contact with immigrants in their current job, which places them at risk 
for exposure to airborne infectious agents. Almost two thirds 
of respondents believe they are at risk of acquiring a respiratory 
infection due to their job, and almost one third responded that 
they frequently worry about this risk. In addition, the percentages 
of respondents who reported having face-to-face contact with 
persons with known infections were 18% for tuberculosis in 
the previous year and 17% for pH1N1 between April 2009 and 
the survey administration. This level of contact indicates that a comprehensive program to protect employees from airborne 
infectious diseases hazards is appropriate. The respirator fit-testing 
process appears to be comprehensive, as most (75%) responding 
employees completed all of the required steps of the respirator 
fit-testing process and were successfully fitted. However, some gaps 
existed particularly in the areas of medical clearance and respirator
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( c o n t i n u e d ) training. O ur findings suggest that verifying documentation of medical clearance did not always occur prior to fit testing. In 
addition, our findings indicate that the training that was supposed 
to have been included in the fit-testing session occasionally either did 
not occur or was suboptimal.
The rate of medical clearance to wear a respirator for those undergoing evaluation was high at 98%. The online respirator 
medical evaluation questionnaire administered through FOH 
is comprehensive and contains all of the questions found in the 
OSHA Respirator Medical Evaluation Questionnaire, Appendix C, 
to the OSHA Respiratory Protection standard [29 CFR 1910.134]. 
This questionnaire is used for medical evaluation and to identify 
persons who require additional examination. A study of Department 
of Energy workers found that a similar medical evaluation 
questionnaire demonstrated a sensitivity of 100% for the detection 
of workers requiring work restrictions [Pappas et al. 1999]. This study 
supports the use of a self-administered questionnaire for medical 
clearance in certain settings such as a large federal agency.
The rate of a successful fit test for those undergoing fit testing was 
high at 97%. The most common reasons cited by respondents for 
not being successfully fitted for a respirator were “I could not get a 
tight seal of the respirator on my face” and “the correct size respirator 
for my face was not available.” These reasons suggest that a larger 
selection of N95 respirators than the three 3M models might need 
to be available. The next most common reason cited by respondents 
for not being successfully fitted was “I have facial hair.” This finding, 
coupled with our observation that some employees with facial hair 
between the face and the respirator sealing surface were being fit 
tested, suggests that fit testers need to improve compliance with the 
OSHA Respiratory Protection standard [29 CFR 1910.134] and deny 
a fit test to those employees with facial hair.
The agency’s tuberculosis exposure control plan states that “all 
employees with potential exposure to detainees or others with active 
tuberculosis will be provided N95 facemasks or HEPA respirators. 
Employees must wear the facemasks in high hazard settings where 
administrative and engineering controls are not likely to provide 
adequate protection. High hazard settings include close contact with 
a suspected active case of tuberculosis and entering a tuberculosis 
isolation room when it is occupied by an individual with a known or 
suspected active case of tuberculosis.”
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( c o n t i n u e d ) The term “facemask” should be replaced with “respirator” in this plan to prevent confusion with surgical face masks, which 
are not appropriate protection from exposure to tuberculosis. 
Furthermore, the term “HEPA respirator” is an outdated term and 
should also be avoided. Instead, the level of protection and the 
level of filtration should be noted (e.g., PAPR with high-efficiency 
filters).
Though most respondents reported having access to N95 filtering 
facepiece respirators, respirator usage by respondents for contact 
with persons with known tuberculosis was low at 17%. This 
indicates that employee training should emphasize the indications 
for respirator use, which include close contact with persons with 
active tuberculosis.
We found low compliance with tuberculosis screening agencywide. 
The agency’s tuberculosis exposure control plan states that all 
employees “who are at risk for exposure to tuberculosis” are 
included in the tuberculosis surveillance and screening program. 
Clarification on how a determination of an employee’s risk for 
exposure to tuberculosis is made is necessary. The plan requires 
baseline PPD testing during all preplacement examinations. The 
employee can provide written documentation of the results of 
a test performed within 6 months of the date of preplacement 
testing. The plan states that “baseline testing will be followed, 
at least annually, by PPD testing and risk assessment.” However, 
almost half of responding employees were not aware of the 
recommendation that they undergo at least annual tuberculosis screening.
Use of respirators or facemasks was not recommended by CDC 
for workers in nonhealthcare occupational settings for general 
work activities during the pH1N1 pandemic [CDC 2009]. C D C ’s 
“Prevention Strategies for Seasonal Influenza in Healthcare 
Settings” currently recommends use of facemasks (not N95 
respirators) by workers for most forms of contact with persons 
with confirmed or suspected influenza in healthcare settings 
[CDC 2010b]. In addition, C D C ’s “Interim Guidance for the Use 
of Masks to Control Influenza Transmission” does not currently 
recommend the use of facemasks or respirators for individuals in 
community settings who are not ill [CDC 2010a].
Less than half of the responding safety officers reported having a 
written respiratory protection program at their workplace, despite
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( c o n t i n u e d ) the availability of an agencywide written program. It is possible that a written respiratory protection program may actually have been 
in existence at their workplace and the safety officer may not have 
known this. Nevertheless, safety officers should be knowledgeable 
about this program. These results are comparable to a survey 
conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of 
Labor, which found that only 35% of private industry workplaces 
that required respirator use had established a written respiratory 
protection program adopted by management [BLS and NIOSH 
2003].
Most responding safety officers reported having a written 
respiratory protection program and reported it had all of the 
required components of the OSHA Respiratory Protection 
standard [29 CFR 1910.134]. Only one third of safety officers 
reported they were the respiratory protection program 
administrator at their workplace, and fewer reported they were 
involved in the selection of appropriate respirators for employees at 
their workplace. These findings demonstrate that the role of safety 
officers in the respiratory protection program should be clarified 
and strengthened.
Most (72%) fit testers felt comfortable conducting a qualitative 
respirator fit test and giving instructions to fit-test subjects during the 
fit-testing session. Nevertheless, we observed that improvements can be made when giving instructions on proper donning of the respirator 
and conducting a seal check. Also, fewer (62%) fit testers thought 
that the training session adequately prepared them to conduct fit 
testing and fewer (54%) felt comfortable answering technical questions 
about respirators. These findings are consistent with our observation 
that some fit testers did not appear to have a solid understanding of the filtering efficiency of respirators during the fit-testing session. 
Though the slide presentation that served as training for fit testers given by FPS was thorough, more details on filtering efficiency and the 
technical capabilities of respirators could be added.
O ur evaluation was subject to some limitations. We observed 
only 1 day of fit testing; thus, these observations may not be 
representative of all fit-testing sessions and all fit testers across the 
agency. Also, while we reviewed the slide presentation that served 
as training for fit testers, we did not observe an actual training 
session. The response rate to our survey was 11% despite two e-mail reminders from employer and union representatives. We believe 
several factors may have contributed to the low response rate. First,
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( c o n t i n u e d ) at the Office of the Chief Information Officers’ directive, we did not have direct contact with all employees and rather relied on this 
office to disseminate the invitation and survey for us. Employees 
may have been uncomfortable responding to a survey sent out 
by management despite being told it was confidential. Second, 
although we intended to invite all agency employees to participate 
in the survey, the e-mail invitation specifically encouraged 
participation among employees who had participated in the recent respirator fit-testing program. Third, though employees were 
instructed not to reply to the e-mail from the agency’s broadcast 
and to send their completed surveys to our dedicated e-mail 
address, it is possible we did not receive all completed surveys due 
to incorrect return. Fourth, the agency disseminated our survey on 
January 14, 2010, 2 days after the earthquake in Haiti. Employees from many agency programs were involved in this response.
Finally, we were unable to verify the num ber of employees who 
actually received this e-mail, so our response rate may be an 
underestimation.
The response rate to our survey is lower than those seen in other 
electronic surveys (mean response rates between 19% and 40%), 
but lower rates are seen in larger surveys, workplace surveys, and 
surveys not offering incentives [Jones and Pitt 1999; Cook et al. 2000; Sheehan 2001; Manfreda and Vehovar 2002; Kaplowitz 
et al. 2004; Shih and Fan 2008]. Nevertheless, our relatively 
low response rate raises the possibility that our results are not 
representative of all agency employees, especially employees from 
the management and leadership offices. An additional limitation 
of this evaluation was that the survey administration period was in January and February 2010. Because the respirator fit-testing 
campaign ended in September 2009, this may have limited 
respondents’ ability to recall certain information about the process 
and may have affected our results.
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C o n c l u s i o n s Most responding agency employees, particularly those from DRO 
and OI, reported having face-to-face contact with immigrants in 
their current job, which places them at risk for potential exposure 
to airborne infectious agents. The quality of the observed respirator 
fit-testing procedures was good, and most responding employees 
completed all of the required steps of the respirator fit testing 
process. However, some gaps with respect to medical clearance and 
respirator training existed. We also found that written respiratory 
protection programs were lacking in some workplaces and that 
employee compliance with respirator usage and that annual 
tuberculosis screening was low.
Re c o m m e n d a t i o n s A comprehensive infection control program, with attention to 
airborne infectious agents, is necessary at agency workplaces 
where employees have the potential for contact with immigrants. 
The program should include all of the following: education of 
employees, hand hygiene, respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette, 
procedures for the screening and management of immigrants 
with fever and respiratory symptoms, exclusion of ill employees 
from work, influenza vaccination, annual tuberculosis screening 
of employees, and a written respiratory protection program for 
employees. Although respirator use was the focus of our evaluation, use of respirators and other PPE ranks lowest in the hierarchy 
of controls and is a last line of defense for employees against 
hazards that cannot otherwise be eliminated or controlled. Careful 
attention to elimination of potential exposures, engineering 
controls, and administrative controls will reduce the need to rely on PPE, including respirators.
O n the basis of our findings, we recommend the actions listed 
below to create a more healthful workplace. We encourage the 
agency to use a labor-management health and safety committee or working group to discuss the recommendations in this report 
and develop an action plan. Those involved in the work can best 
set priorities and assess the feasibility of our recommendations for 
the specific situation at the agency. W hile these recommendations 
focus on the areas covered in our evaluation, we note that they only address some of the elements necessary for a comprehensive 
infection control program.
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( c o n t i n u e d ) Recommendations for Management
1. Develop and maintain a written respiratory protection program 
for all agency workplaces to protect employees against airborne 
infectious agents and other respiratory hazards. Clearly define 
which employees are covered under the respiratory protection 
program and which employees should wear respirators and the 
circumstances under which respirators should be worn. Include 
all areas listed in the OSHA Respiratory Protection standard [29 
CFR 1910.134] in the program, especially cleaning, disinfecting, 
storing, inspecting, repairing, and discarding respirators; and 
evaluating the effectiveness of the program.
2. Clarify the roles and responsibilities of the designated local 
safety officers within the respiratory protection program.
3. Offer a larger selection of N95 filtering facepiece respirators 
during the fit-testing campaign to correctly fit employees. For 
example, elastomeric respirators may an appropriate alternative to N95 filtering facepiece respirators. Also, loose-fitting PAPRs 
may be considered for employees with facial hair.
4. W hen respirator use is required, continue to require and 
arrange medical clearance as defined in the OSHA Respiratory 
Protection standard [29 CFR 1910.134] prior to fit testing.A written recommendation of whether or not the employee 
is medically able to use the respirator and any limitations on 
respirator use should be provided to the appropriate supervisors and the program administrator. It also might be helpful for 
agencywide records to be kept in a central location. Confidential 
medical information should not be shared with employee 
supervisors, the program administrator, or management.
5. Require and arrange annual respirator training as defined in 
the OSHA Respiratory Protection standard [29 CFR 1910.134]. 
Improve training to include specific indications for respirator 
use especially when employees come into contact with persons 
with active tuberculosis. Consider offering a training session 
separate from the fit-testing procedures.
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( c o n t i n u e d ) 6. Require and arrange fit testing annually, or when a different respirator facepiece (size, style, model, or make) is used, or when 
a change in an employee’s physical condition occurs that could 
affect respirator fit [29 CFR 1910.134]. Schedule additional 
sessions to accommodate employees who are unable to attend 
scheduled dates and times because of leave or job assignments.
7. Provide a mirror during fit-testing procedures to assist the subject in evaluating the fit and positioning of the respirator [29 CFR
1910.134].
8. Develop and maintain clear written procedures for the use of respirators. Inform employees of these procedures. Define when 
voluntary use of respirators is permitted. Follow the OSHA 
Respiratory Protection standard [29 CFR 1910.134] regarding voluntary use including providing Appendix D of the OSHA 
respiratory protection standard [29 CFR 1910.134] to employees.
9. Conduct annual evaluations of the workplace to ensure that the 
written respiratory protection program is properly implemented, 
and consult employees to ensure that they are using the 
respirators properly [29 CFR 1910.134].
10. Improve training provided to fit testers to include information 
regarding filtering efficiency and the technical capabilities of 
respirators.
11. Define which employees are at risk for exposure to tuberculosis. Inform these employees that routine tuberculosis screening is 
recommended and that this screening should occur at least 
annually. Make employees aware that FOH offers tuberculosis 
screening at no cost to the employee.
12. Recommend the influenza vaccine to all employees annually. 
Make employees aware that FOH offers influenza vaccination at no cost to the employee. Explore the feasibility of offering the 
influenza vaccination to employees at the workplace.
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( c o n t i n u e d ) Recommendations for Fit Testers
1. Verify medical clearance of subjects prior to performing a fit test.
2. Deny a fit test to those subjects with facial hair that comes 
between the sealing surface of the respirator and the face [29
CFR 1910.134].
3. During the fit test, include specific instructions on proper donning and doffing of the respirator, following manufacturer 
instructions. If the test subject is not familiar with using a 
particular respirator, direct the test subject to don the mask 
several times and to adjust the straps each time to become adept 
at setting proper tension on the strap [29 CFR 1910.134].
4. Instruct fit test subjects on the appropriate way to perform a face 
seal check and ensure that these instructions conform to those 
of the respirator manufacturer.
Recommendations for Employees
1. Get fit tested if you are required to wear a respirator.
2. Follow workplace guidelines on use of respirators including the 
corresponding guidelines on facial hair.
3. Review manufacturer instructions for donning and doffing a 
respirator.
4. Perform a face seal check prior to each use of a respirator.
5. Report any change in medical status that may affect your ability 
to safely wear respiratory protection to your supervisor.
6. Undergo annual screening for tuberculosis.
7. Get the seasonal influenza vaccine every year.
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Tuberculosis
Tuberculosis, a disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium tuberculosis, is spread from person to person 
through the air. Tuberculosis usually infects the lungs, but it can also infect other body parts such as the 
brain, kidneys, or spine. The symptoms of active tuberculosis disease in any body part include feeling 
sick or weak, weight loss, fever, and night sweats. The symptoms of tuberculosis disease of the lungs also 
include coughing, chest pain, and coughing up blood.
Tuberculosis bacteria are released into the air when a person with tuberculosis disease of the lungs or 
throat coughs, sneezes, or speaks. These bacteria can stay in the air for several hours, depending on the 
environment. Persons who breathe in the air containing these tuberculosis bacteria can become infected; 
this is called latent tuberculosis infection.
Persons with latent tuberculosis infection have tuberculosis bacteria in their bodies, but they are not ill 
because the bacteria are not active. These persons do not have symptoms of tuberculosis disease, and they 
cannot spread the germs to others. They may develop tuberculosis disease in the future but can be treated 
to prevent this from happening. Persons with tuberculosis disease are sick from active tuberculosis bacteria 
that are multiplying and destroying tissue in their body. They usually have symptoms of tuberculosis 
disease and are capable of spreading tuberculosis bacteria to others.
It is estimated that one third of the world’s population has latent tuberculosis infection, and approximately 
5% -10%  of those infected will develop active tuberculosis disease within their lifetimes [Styblo 1980;
Dye et al. 1999; Jasmer et al. 2002; Stewart et al. 2003]. More than 37 million foreign-born persons are 
currently living in the United States [DHS 2008]. Many of the undocumented immigrants processed by the federal immigration and customs agency annually come from countries with a high prevalence of 
tuberculosis.
In 2009, foreign-born persons accounted for 60% of all tuberculosis cases in the United States [CDC 
2010a]. The tuberculosis case rate for foreign-born persons is more than 10 times as high as the case rate 
for U.S.-born persons (18.6 vs. 1.7 cases per 100,000 persons) [CDC 2010a]. In 2009, four countries accounted for more than half of the tuberculosis cases in foreign-born persons: Mexico, the Philippines, 
India, and Vietnam [CDC 2010a]. Among all foreign-born populations, tuberculosis rates are highest in 
the first 2 years after U.S. entry (75 vs. 16 cases per 100,000 persons) [Cain et al. 2008]. It has been shown 
that undocumented foreign-born persons had a longer duration of symptoms before medical evaluation 
for tuberculosis when compared to U.S.-born persons and documented foreign-born persons [Achkar 
et al. 2008]. The tuberculosis case rate among people in the custody of the federal immigrations and 
customs agency was found to be 12.5 per 100,000 persons in 2005, with patients from Mexico, Honduras, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador accounting for 84.4% of the cases [Schneider and Lobato 2007].
It has been shown that 20% -30%  of tuberculosis patient case contacts will be found to have latent 
tuberculosis infection and that approximately 5% of individuals with recently acquired latent tuberculosis 
infection will develop active tuberculosis disease within 2 years [Iseman 2000; CDC 2005a]. These data, in
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conjunction with the higher rates demonstrated among foreign-born persons, suggest that individuals who 
come into contact with these recent entrants, including immigration officers and agents, are at risk for 
acquiring tuberculosis.
In 1996, OSHA issued revised enforcement guidelines concerning occupational tuberculosis exposure 
[OSHA 1996]. The workplaces covered in those guidelines are those where the CDC has identified 
workers as having an elevated incidence of tuberculosis infection. These include healthcare settings, 
correctional institutions, homeless shelters, drug treatment centers, and long-term care facilities for 
the elderly. At these facilities, the OSHA guidelines require a protocol for the early identification 
of individuals with active tuberculosis; skin-test surveillance for employees; medical evaluation and 
management of employees with positive skin tests or symptoms of active tuberculosis; placement of individuals with confirmed or suspected tuberculosis in isolation rooms; performing high risk procedures 
in areas with negative pressure and appropriate exhausts; and training and information for employees 
about tuberculosis transmission, signs and symptoms of disease, medical surveillance and follow-up 
therapy, and proper use of controls [OSHA 1996].
The OSHA guidelines are based on the 1994 CDC guidelines for preventing tuberculosis transmission in 
healthcare facilities, which were subsequently updated in 2005 [CDC 2005b]. This document discusses, in 
detail, the importance of administrative and engineering controls, PPE, early identification and screening, 
risk assessment, a written tuberculosis control program, skin testing programs, and employee education. The 2006 CDC guidelines for preventing tuberculosis transmission in correctional and detention facilities 
also recommend a comprehensive program consisting of administrative, environmental, and personal 
respiratory protection controls [CDC 2006].
Environmental controls should be implemented when the risk for tuberculosis transmission persists 
despite efforts to screen and treat inmates/detainees. Environmental controls are used to remove or 
inactivate Mycobacterium tuberculosis in areas in which the organism could be transmitted. Additional information on the types of environmental controls used in correctional and detention facilities 
can be found in the 2006 CDC guidelines [CDC 2006]. This document provides ventilation design 
considerations and air exhaust/cleaning methods for airborne infection isolation rooms and local and 
general exhaust ventilation systems in areas intended to contain persons with diagnosed or undiagnosed 
infectious tuberculosis. Individuals known or suspected of having tuberculosis disease should be placed 
in an airborne infection isolation room or cell [CDC 2005b; CDC 2006]. Facilities w ithout an on-site 
airborne infection isolation room should have a written plan for referring detainees with suspected or 
confirmed tuberculosis to a facility that is equipped to isolate, evaluate, and treat tuberculosis patients 
[CDC 2006].
One im portant administrative component of tuberculosis control in correctional and detention facilities 
involves routinely screening employees and inmates/detainees for latent tuberculosis infection, using the 
TST or an interferon-gamma release assay, and administering isoniazid treatment to those individuals 
testing positive. Two-step TST testing is necessary for those employees who have not undergone a TST in 
more than a year to account for the boosting effect [ATS and CDC 2000, ATS et al. 2000]. The agency
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tuberculosis exposure control plan states that TST testing should be conducted at least annually on 
employees “at risk of exposure to tuberculosis.” U pon admission to the agency’s custody, detainees are 
expected to be screened for tuberculosis disease in accordance with agency detention standards. Suspected 
tuberculosis patients are further evaluated and started or continued on treatment for tuberculosis disease 
if medically indicated.
Respiratory protection is used when administrative and environmental controls alone have not reduced the risk for infection with Mycobacterium tuberculosis to an acceptable level. For example, protection is 
warranted for inmates and facility staff when they enter airborne infection isolation rooms or transport 
infectious inmates. Respirators should be selected from those approved by C D C /N IO SH  under the 
provisions outlined in 60 Fed. Reg. 30355 (1995) [CFR, 2010]. Decisions regarding which respirator is 
appropriate for a particular situation and setting should be made on the basis of a risk assessment of the 
likelihood for tuberculosis transmission. For correctional and detention facilities, a NIOSH-approved N95 
air-purifying respirator will provide adequate respiratory protection in most situations that require the use 
of respirators [CDC 2006].
Influenza
Influenza, commonly known as the flu, is a contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza viruses. 
Influenza viruses are thought to be spread mainly by droplets made when people with influenza cough, sneeze, 
or talk. Less often, a person might also get influenza by touching a surface or object that has influenza virus 
on it and then touching their own mouth, eyes, or nose [Wright and Webster 2001]. Evidence for airborne 
transmission of influenza also exists [Bridges et al. 2003; Blachere et al. 2009; Lindsley et al. 2010a,b].
Influenza can cause mild to severe illness and at times can lead to death. Symptoms of influenza include fever, 
chills, cough, sore throat, runny or stuffy nose, muscle or body aches, headaches, and fatigue, vomiting, and 
diarrhea [Nicholson 1992]. Complications of influenza include bacterial pneumonia, ear infections, sinus 
infections, dehydration, and worsening of chronic medical conditions [CDC 2010c]. Individuals at higher risk 
for developing influenza-related complications include children younger than 5 years old (especially children 
younger than 2 years old), adults 65 years of age and older, pregnant women, and people with chronic medical 
conditions (including asthma, chronic lung disease, neurological conditions, heart disease, blood, endocrine, 
kidney, liver, and metabolic disorders, weakened immune system due to HIV, cancer, or medication, morbid 
obesity) [CDC 2010c]. An annual average of approximately 36,000 deaths and 226,000 hospitalizations has 
been associated with influenza epidemics [Thompson et al. 2003; Thompson et al. 2004].
The 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) (pH1N1) virus, also referred to as “swine flu,” was first detected in 
humans in the United States in April 2009. O n June 11, 2009, the World Health Organization signaled that a 
pandemic of pH1N1 was underway. CDC estimated that, between April 2009 and April 2010, 43-89 million 
cases of pH1N1, 195,000-403,000 pH1N1-related hospitalizations, and 8,870-18,300 pH1N1-related deaths 
occurred [CDC 2010e].
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Spread of the pH1N1 virus is thought to occur in the same way that seasonal influenza spreads [CDC 
2009a]. The symptoms of pH1N1 infection include fever, cough, sore throat, runny or stuffy nose, body 
aches, headache, chills, and fatigue. Some patients have vomiting and diarrhea, while some patients have 
respiratory symptoms without a fever. Illness with the pH1N1 virus has ranged from mild to severe. While 
most people who have been sick have recovered without needing medical treatment, hospitalizations and 
deaths from infection with this virus have occurred. Many people who have been hospitalized with this 
pH1N1 virus have had one or more medical conditions previously recognized as placing people at “high 
risk” of serious seasonal influenza-related complications, including pregnancy, diabetes, heart disease, 
asthma, and kidney disease [CDC 2009a]. In contrast to seasonal influenza, nearly 90% of deaths occurred 
among people younger than 65 years of age [CDC 2010c].
A comprehensive influenza infection control program should include all of the following: education of 
employees, influenza vaccination, hand hygiene, respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette, procedures 
for the screening and management of detainees with fever and respiratory symptoms, and the exclusion 
of ill employees. Use of N95 respirators or facemasks was not recommended by CDC for workers in 
nonhealthcare occupational settings for general work activities during the pH1N1 pandemic [CDC 2009c]. 
C D C ’s “Prevention Strategies for Seasonal Influenza in Healthcare Settings” currently recommends use 
of facemasks (not N95 respirators) by workers for most forms of contact with persons with confirmed or 
suspected influenza in healthcare settings [CDC 2010d]. In addition, C D C ’s “Interim Guidance for the Use of Masks to Control Influenza Transmission” does not currently recommend the use of face masks or 
respirators for individuals in community settings who are not ill [CDC 2010b].
Measles
Measles is a highly transmissible infectious disease caused by the rubeola virus. It causes fever, cough, 
runny nose, and a maculopapular (red, bumpy) rash. Transmission primarily occurs from person to person 
via large respiratory droplets. However, airborne transmission via aerosolized droplet nuclei has been 
documented in closed areas for up to 2 hours after a person with measles occupied the area [Bloch et al. 
1985]. Measles is highly communicable and may be transmitted from 4 days before to 4 days after rash 
onset.
Measles is still a common and often fatal disease in developing countries. The W orld Health Organization 
estimated that there were more than 20 million cases and 242,000 deaths from measles in 2006 [CDC 
2009b]. The disease is less common in the United States since the first measles vaccine was licensed for 
use in 1963. Most measles cases in the United States now are imported from other countries or linked to 
imported cases. Most imported cases originate in Asia and Europe and occur among U.S. citizens traveling 
abroad and persons visiting the United States from other countries [CDC 2009b]. Measles vaccination remains the best method of prevention. The MMR vaccine for measles, mumps, and rubella is indicated 
for all children 12 months of age and older and susceptible adolescents and adults without documented 
evidence of immunity [CDC 2009b].
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Chicken Pox
Varicella or chicken pox is an acute infectious disease caused by the varicella zoster virus. It is characterized 
by fever, malaise, and a generalized, itchy, blistering then crusting rash. Recovery from primary varicella infection usually results in lifetime immunity. Transmission occurs from person to person from infected 
respiratory tract secretions, inhalation of airborne droplets, or by direct contact or inhalation of aerosols 
from skin lesions [CDC 2009b]. Varicella is highly contagious. It can be transmitted 1 to 2 days before 
rash onset through the first 4 to 5 days or until lesions have formed crusts [CDC 2009b].
In the prevaccine era, varicella was endemic in the United States, and virtually all persons acquired 
varicella by adulthood. Since the varicella vaccine was first licensed for use in the United States in March 
1995, the num ber of cases has significantly decreased [Seward et al. 2002].
In correctional and detention facilities, inmates with varicella should be isolated from other inmates and 
susceptible personnel until lesions crust. Inmates with varicella or disseminated herpes zoster should be 
transferred to a community hospital, if medically indicated. Otherwise, they should be housed either in 
the institution’s airborne infection isolation room or in a single cell with a door that closes restricted. All staff or inmates entering the cell of an inmate with contagious chickenpox or disseminated herpes zoster 
should wear at least an N95 filtering facepiece respirator or higher. They should wear gloves when any 
direct contact with the inmate is anticipated [BOP 2009].
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A p p e n d ix  B: Re s p i r a t o r s
An estimated 5 million workers are required to wear respirators at least some of the time while performing their 
job in 1.3 million workplaces throughout the United States [OSHA 2010]. A respirator is a personal protective 
device that is worn on the face, covers at least the nose and mouth, and is designed to protect the wearer from 
the inhalation of hazardous airborne particles (including dust particles and infectious agents), gases, or vapors. 
Respirators should only be used as a “last line of defense” in the hierarchy of controls when engineering 
and administrative controls are not feasible or are being put in place. The overall effectiveness of respiratory 
protection is affected by (1) the level of respiratory protection selected (i.e., the assigned protection factor),
(2) the fitting characteristics of the respirator model, (3) the care taken in donning the respirator, and (4) the 
effectiveness of the respiratory protection program, including fit testing and worker training.
Respirators are categorized into two principal types: air-purifying and air-supplied. Air-purifying respirators 
remove contaminants from the ambient air. Respirators of this type include particulate respirators, which filter 
out airborne particles and “gas masks,” which filter out chemicals and gases. The classification of particulate 
respirators can be further subdivided into particulate filtering facepiece respirators, elastomeric respirators, and 
PAPRs.
Particulate filtering facepiece respirators are sometimes referred to as disposable respirators because the entire 
respirator is discarded when it becomes unsuitable for further use because of considerations of hygiene, excessive 
resistance, or physical damage (Figure B1). Ten classes of NIOSH-approved particulate filtering respirators are 
available at this time. The minimal level of filtration approved by NIOSH is 95%. The N, R, and P designations 
refer to the filter’s oil resistance as described in Table B1.
Elastomeric respirators are sometimes referred to as reusable respirators because the facepiece is cleaned 
and reused, but the filter cartridges are discarded and replaced when they become unsuitable for further use. An example of a half-mask elastomeric respirator can be seen in Figure B2.
Table B1. NIOSH-approved particulate filtering facepiece respirators and their filtering efficiencies
Filter Class Description
N95, N99, N100 Filters at least 95%, 99%, 99.97% of airborne
particles. Not resistant to oil.
R95, R99, R100 Filters at least 95%, 99%, 99.97% of airborne
particles. Somewhat resistant to oil.
P95, P99, P100 Filters at least 95%, 99%, 99.97% of airborne
particles. Strongly resistant to oil.
HE (High Efficiency Particulate Air) Filters at least 99.97% of airborne particles. For use
on PAPRs only. PAPRs use only HE filters.
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(c o n t i n u e d )
Figure B1. A preformed filtering facepiece 
respirator in which the facepiece is comprised 
of the filter material.
Figure B2. A half-mask elastomeric respirator 
comprised of a molded facepiece to which 
replaceable filtering cartridges are attached.
PAPRs have a battery-powered blower that moves the air flow through the filters. PAPRs can either be 
tight-fitting or loose-fitting. Tight-fitting facepieces form a seal with the wearer’s face and must be fit tested 
to be sure that there is no leakage into the face mask. Loose-fitting facepieces cover all or part of the head without sealing directly onto the face. Examples of tight-fitting and loose-fitting PAPRs can be seen in 
Figure B3.
Air-supplied respirators provide air from a source other than the surrounding atmosphere. Air-supplied 
respirators are classified according to the method by which air is supplied and the way in which the 
air supply is regulated. These methods include SCBA, which include their own air supply, and airline 
respirators, which use compressed air from a remote source. A photograph of an SCBA is shown in Figure 
B4. Air-supplied respirators generally offer a higher level of protection than air-purifying respirators. 
Typically, workers exposed to high levels of contaminants, oxygen deficient or flammable atmospheres, or 
emergency conditions, are assigned to wear these respirators [Szeinuk et al. 2000].
Figure B3. Various types of PAPRs. A 
loose-fitting PAPR is shown on the left. 
Two examples of tight-fitting PAPRs are 
shown in the middle and on the right.
Figure B4. An SCBA containing the 
respirator and air supply.
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NIOSH is responsible for classifying and certifying respirators for general and specific uses [NIOSH 1991]. 
NIOSH approval includes respirator components such as facepiece, strap, harnesses, filters, chemical 
cartridges, regulators, air hoses, and connectors. All respirators used to protect workers must be NIOSH- 
approved or otherwise accepted by OSHA. All NIOSH-approved respirators have an approval number. 
W ith few exceptions, the NIOSH approval num ber is not on the respirator itself, but on a separate 
NIOSH approval label that is found on or within the packaging. An example of this type of NIOSH label 
is shown in Figure B5. Figure B6 shows typical markings on approved filtering facepiece respirators. The 
markings shown in red are present on all NIOSH-approved filtering facepiece respirators, although they 
may appear either on the face, on the exhalation valve (if one exists) or on the head straps. The markings shown in black may or may not be on the respirator at all. The model or part num ber marked on the 
respirator will also appear on the approval label.
Respirator Manu fatturi ny Company
Anytown, Any state USA 
1-800-123-4567
THIS RESPIRATOR IS APPROVED ONLY IN I  HI-: FOLLOW IN'ti C'UM-HiU RATION:
TC- jProtection Respirator Cautions and Limitations
TC-84A-0000 N45 X I-X2 ABCJMNOP
Addrlional Nubs may appear here showing more approval numbers and associated inionmaUon
1. Protection_____________________________________________________________________
N95 ■ Particulate Filter (95% filler ctllciency level)
Effect ivc against pajttculate aerosols free o f oil;
time use restrictions may apply__________________________________________________________
2, C au tions  and  L im ita t io n s
A - Noi for use in atmospheres coma in ing less than 19.5% oxygen.
SI - Nut tor use in atmospheres immediately dangerous to life or lieulill.
C * not e Kited maximum uw concent™ions established by regulatory standards.
I ■ Failure to properly use and maintain this product could result in injury or death.
M - A ll approved respirators shall be selected, filled, used, and maintained in ¡vccordante with MSH A, 
OSHA and other applicable regulations.
N * Never substitute, modify, add. or otnil parts, Use only exact replacement pans in the 
configuration as specified by the manufacturer.
O * Refer to users instructions. and/or maintenance manuals far informal ion on use and 
maintenance o f these respirators.
P - NIOSH docs not evaluate respirators for use a& surgical masks
Figure B5. Example of the NIOSH respirator approval label.
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TC M XXX--XXXX -TC-approval number
Example o f Exterior Markings
Approval holder business name, a 
registered trademark Manufadnr#f 
S u ite s »  name ex' an easily understood 
abbreviation. If privately labeled, the private 
label name or logo is h*ro instead of 1he 
approval holder bus'ness name
NIOSH *  NIOSH name in block letter* or a 
NlQ$H I090
Falter designation -  NIOSH fine* series Afpha-nuifiencal rating iollcwad by filter 
efficiency level {ex F 100, N95)
Figure B6. Example of typical markings on approved filtering facepiece respirators.
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A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s  a n d  
A VAiLABiLiTY OF REPORT
The Hazard Evaluations and Technical Assistance Branch (HETAB) of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) conducts field investigations of possible health hazards in the workplace. These investigations are conducted under the authority of Section 20(a)(6) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 669(a)(6) which authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services, following a written request from any employer or authorized representative of employees, to determine whether any substance normally found in the place of employment has potentially toxic effects in such concentrations as used or found. HETAB also provides, upon request, technical and consultative assistance to federal, state, and local agencies; labor; industry; and other groups or individuals to control occupational health hazards and to prevent related trauma and disease.
The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of NIOSH. M ention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by NIOSH. In addition, citations to websites external to NIOSH do not constitute NIOSH endorsement of the sponsoring organizations or their programs or products. Furthermore, NIOSH is not responsible for the content of these websites. All Web addresses referenced in this document were accessible as of the publication date.
This report was prepared by Marie A. de Perio, R. Todd Niemeier, Bradley S. King, and Charles A. Mueller of HETAB, Division of Surveillance, Hazard Evaluations and Field Studies. Information technology support was provided by Scott Mason. Data management support was provided by Faith Armstrong. Health communication assistance was provided by Stefanie Evans. Editorial assistance was provided by Ellen Galloway. Desktop publishing was performed by Greg W. Hartle.
Copies of this report have been sent to employee and management representatives at the federal immigration and customs agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration National Office. This report is not copyrighted and may be freely reproduced. The report may be viewed and printed at http://www.cdc.gov/ n io sh /h h e /. Copies may be purchased from the National Technical Information Service at 5825 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161.
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National Institute fo r  Occupational Safety and Health
Delivering on the Nation’s promise: Safety and health at work for all people through research and prevention.
To receive NIOSH documents or information about 
occupational safety and health topics, contact NIOSH at:
1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636)
TTY: 1-888-232-6348
E-mail: cdcinfo@cdc.gov
or visit the NIOSH web site at: w w w.cdc.gov/n iosh.
For a monthly update on news at NIOSH, subscribe to 
NIOSH eNews by visiting www.cdc.gov/niosh/eNews.
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